‘The art of living with ICTs ’ today not only means finding new ways to cope, interact and create new lifestyles on the basis of the new digital technologies individually, as ‘consumer-citizens’. It also means inventing new modes of living, producing and, not in the least place, struggling collectively, as workers and producers. As the so-called digital revolution unfolds in the context of a neoliberal cognitive and consumerist capitalism, its ‘innovations’ are predominantly employed to modulate and control both production processes (...) and consumer behavior in view of the overall goal of extracting surplus value. Today, the digital networks overwhelmingly destroy social autonomy, instead engendering increasing social heteronomy and proletarianization. Yet it is these very networks themselves, as technical pharmaka in the sense of French ‘technophilosopher’ Bernard Stiegler, that can be employed as no other to struggle against this tendency. This paper briefly explores this possibility by reflecting upon current diagnoses of our ‘technological situation’ by some exemplary post-operaist Marxists from a Stieglerian, pharmacological perspective. (shrink)

Le sens et la portée de l’ecclésiologie doivent se comprendre dans le cadre de la théologie dogmatique. L’Église est à la fois sujet et objet de la théologie. D’une part, elle est le lieu où la théologie se fait en déployant la foi apostolique; de l’autre, l’Église est objet de la réflexion théologique lorsque les chrétiens tentent de définir sa nature et sa place dans le dessein de Dieu. L’exemple de la relation entre christologie, pneumatologie et ecclésiologie permet de montrer (...) que le credo de l’Église contient une ecclésiologie implicite. Lorsque cette ecclésiologie devient explicite, la question de l’action de l’Esprit saint dans l’Église conduit la recherche théologique à comprendre la communauté chrétienne comme étant à la fois Creatura Verbi et Creatura Spiritus sancti. (shrink)

La polémique qui a suivi le discours du pape Benoît XVI à Ratisbonne, le 12 septembre 2006, a porté non sur le thème lui-même qu’il abordait, à savoir la nécessité d’un dialogue de la foi et de la raison, mais sur l’exemple qu’il a choisi pour illustrer son propos. L’exemple choisi pour illustrer le propos, à savoir la citation d’un dialogue entre l’empereur byzantin chrétien Manuel II et un interlocuteur persan musulman en 1391, voulait dénoncer la violence que peut générer (...) une religion, en l’occurrence l’islam, qui ne se conforme pas à la raison. Malheureusement la polémique qui a éclaté au sujet de l’exemple a occulté le contenu du discours. Dans le débat, on n’a pas suffisamment pris en compte les éléments de contextualité ni de genre littéraire. Cette controverse révèle que le pape Benoît XVI privilégie un genre littéraire dans son ministère d’enseignement, qui est la conférence académique. Les exégètes de la parole pontificale doivent prendre en compte ce fait nouveau. (shrink)

Une approche interdisciplinaire du concept de personne permet de mettre en évidence toutes les difficultés à le définir et la fragilité de ce qu’il veut embrasser intellectuellement. Mais « si la personne revient, écrit Paul Ricœur, c’est qu’elle est le meilleur candidat pour soutenir les combats juridiques, politiques et sociaux ». Or une réflexion responsable sur la personne ne peut pas ignorer la voix, même ténue, d’Emmanuel Mounier. Car bien qu’il soit un mouvement protéiforme, le personnalisme évoque, en France, immanquablement (...) le nom de ce penseur inclassable, et de sa revue Esprit. Le personnalisme de Mounier affirme le primat de la personne humaine sur les nécessités matérielles et sur les appareils collectifs qui soutiennent son développement, tout en la distinguant de l’individu en ce qu’elle est une conscience de l’être au monde, par la découverte de l’incarnation, par l’appel à s’approprier la singularité de son existence dans la recherche d’autrui, et par la constitution d’une communauté. Cet article mettra en valeur que le personnalisme de Mounier est d’essence chrétienne et se fonde dans une métaphysique de la relation, sans faire l’impasse sur les reproches, infondés, qu’on fait parfois à Mounier, d’avoir eu, dans sa critique du libéralisme et de la démocratie, des sympathies pour le fascisme. (shrink)

Freedom and security are often portrayed as things that have to be traded off against one another, but this view does not capture the full complexity of the freedom-security relationship. Rather, there seem to be four different ways in which freedom and security connect to each other: freedom can come at the cost of security, security can come at the cost of freedom, freedom can work to the benefit of security, and security can work to the benefit of freedom. This (...) paper analyses each of these connections in turn. It shows that particular understandings of freedom can help us to see particular connections between freedom and security. The practical examples used to illustrate these connections are drawn from the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It will be suggested that, in the face of challenges such as this one, taking into account all four connections between freedom and security can ultimately help decision-makers in upholding both. (shrink)

In this important new study, Pieter Duvenage shows that Habermas’s work on aesthetics, far from being marginal to his core concerns, is central to understanding and evaluating Habermas's entire theoretical enterprise. This important new study shows that Habermas's work on aesthetics is central to understanding and evaluating his entire theoretical enterprise. Duvenage demonstrates that, in the first phase of his intellectual career, Habermas emphasizes the communicative and societal relevance of art; in the second phase, the idea of a communicative (...) aesthetics is worked out in terms of a theory of rationality. Reveals that Habermas’s later work offers a third, albeit undeveloped, alternative that suggests a convergence of the two. Offers a critical perspective on the role of aesthetics in Habermas's work and proposes possible alternatives. (shrink)

In various publications over the past years, Floridi has developed a theory of semantic information as well-formed, meaningful, and truthful data. This theory is more or less orthogonal to the standard entropy-based notions of information known from physics, information theory, and computer science that all define the amount of information in a certain system as a scalar value without any direct semantic implication. In this context the question rises what the exact relation between these various conceptions of information is and (...) whether there is a real need to enrich these mathematically more or less rigid definitions with a less formal notion of semantic information. I investigate various philosophical aspects of the more formal definitions of information in the light of Floridi’s theory. The position I defend is that the formal treatment of the notion of information as a general theory of entropy is one of the fundamental achievements of modern science that in itself is a rich source for new philosophical reflection. This makes information theory a competitor of classical epistemology rather than a servant. In this light Floridi’s philosophy of information is more a reprise of classical epistemology that only pays lip service to information theory but fails to address the important central questions of philosophy of information. Specifically, I will defend the view that notions that are associated with truth, knowledge, and meaning all can adequately be reconstructed in the context of modern information theory and that consequently there is no need to introduce a concept of semantic information. (shrink)

The central thesis of this essay is that basic income experiments are justified if their expected benefits in terms of justice exceed their expected costs in terms of justice. The benefits are a function of basic income’s effect on the level of justice attained in the context in which it is implemented, and the experiment’s impact on future policy-making. The costs comprise the sacrifices made as a result of the experiment’s interventional character, as well as the study’s opportunity costs. In (...) light of the proposed standard of justification for basic income experiments, the factors that play a role in it, and the way these interact with one another, this essay provides some practical recommendations for researchers hoping to conduct such an experiment. (shrink)

Quel est le type de rationalité que peut revendiquer la théologie dans le champ des savoirs ? Pas seulement d’épistémologie, la question prend aujourd’hui une tournure nettement plus utilitaire : qu’est-ce qui justifie le fait que des institutions prestigieuses comme les universités entretiennent encore à grand frais des Facultés dont l’objet même est devenu culturellement marginal ? Craintes illusoires ? Les gestionnaires des universités d’inspiration chrétienne, comme il en existe dans mon pays, vous diront qu’elles ne sont pas dépourvues de (...) fondement. Les urgences en termes humains : là est l’enjeu. Nos sociétés se trouvent face à des défis inédits. La prise de conscience la plus récente est la catastrophe écologique qui nous menace. Et l’écologie n’est pas le seul défi. Nous vivons dans un monde d’inégalités terrifiantes, où sévissent de nombreux espaces de famine, où la violence semble incontrôlable, où les idéologies religieuses qu’on croyait mortes exercent encore des ravages. L’enjeu, ce n’est donc pas la survie d’institutions vénérables, ni même la qualification culturelle de notre digne corporation, mais l’avenir de la planète et de cette espèce de vivants très particulière, les humains. A moins d’être inconscient, le théologien qui essaie de faire son métier dans ce contexte ne peut que s’interroger sur la pertinence de son travail et sur la responsabilité qui est la sienne.What kind of rationality can theology claim in the field of knowledge? No longer solely epistemological, this question today takes on a decidedly more utilitarian turn: what might justify the fact that prestigious institutions such as universities still maintain at great cost departments the only object of which has become culturally marginal? Illusory fears? The administrators of universities of Christian inspiration, as we have in my country, will tell you that these questions are well founded. What is paramount is the urgency of the issues human being must face. Our societies have to cope with previously unheard of challenges, the most recent of which is the realization that we are facing the threat of an ecological catastrophe, and this is not the only one. We live in a world of terrifying inequalities, where many areas are plagued by famine, violence appears uncontrollable, and religious ideologies we thought long past still wreak havoc. What is at stake is thus not the survival of venerable institutions, nor even the cultural qualification of our worthy community of scholars, but the future of the planet and of this very particular species – human beings. Unless they insist on being oblivious to the situation, theologians trying to do their job in this context cannot help but question what the pertinence of their work might be and what their responsibility is. (shrink)

Aristotle's philosophically most explicit and sophisticated account of the concept of a (primary-)universal proof is found, not in "Analytica Posteriora" 1.4, where he introduces the notion, but in 1.5. In 1.4 Aristotle merely says that a universal proof must be of something arbitrary as well as of something primary and seems to explain primacy in extensional terms, as concerning the largest possible domain. In 1.5 Aristotle improves upon this account after considering three ways in which we may delude ourselves into (...) thinking we have a primary-universal proof. These three sources of delusion are shown to concern situations in which our arguments do establish the desired conclusion for the largest possible domain, but still fail to be real primary-universal proofs. Presupposing the concept of what may be called an immediate proof, in which something is proved of an arbitrary individual, Aristotle in response now demands that a proof be immediate of the primary thing itself and goes on to sketch a framework in which an intensional criterion for primacy can be formulated. For the most part this article is a comprehensive and detailed commentary on Aristotle's very concise exposition in 1.5. One important result is that the famous passage 74a17-25 referring to two ways of proving the alternation of proportions cannot be used as evidence for the development of pre-Euclidean mathematics. (shrink)

In this reply I try to show that, contrary to Milberry’s apparent assertion, the general intellect of the multitude does not have the explanatory robustness she accredits to it. Digital network technologies are currently overwhelmingly effective in proletarianizing and disempowering the cognitariat and only an active technopolitics of deproletarianization could reverse this hegemonic situation. In my response to Verbeek, I attempt to correct his misinterpretation of the Stieglerian approach as being dialectical in nature and show that, far from reinstating the (...) humanist dichotomy between human beings and technologies, my analysis assumes their original, albeit fundamentally ambiguous and even ‘uncanny’ [unheimlich] interconnection. I conclude with pointing out some implications of this view for a ‘really realistic’ political theory of technology. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a wider application of Archon Fung's (2007) idea of a "pragmatic equilibrium". Would implementation of the practical recommendations that follow from a certain theory really contribute to the realisation of the values on which the theory was built? If political philosophers asked this question more often, this would benefit both the quality and the relevance of their theories. [Dutch].

In the South African debate about the role of the media in the new South African society, the African moral philosophy ubuntuism is from time to time raised as a framework for African normative media theory. Up till now, the possibility of using ubuntuism as a normative framework can, however, not yet be described as a focused effort to develop a comprehensive theory on the basis of which media performance could be measured from ‘an African perspective’. Rather, the topic of (...) ubuntuism as normative media theory should be seen in the context of the African Renaissance as part of an intellectual quest to rediscover and re-establish idealized values of traditional African culture and communities and to apply it to contemporary phenomena such as the media. However, given South Africa's history of apartheid in which Christian nationalism was misused as a moral philosophy to mobilize a patriotic media in the service of volk and vaderland, it is not too early to ask critical questions about ubuntuism as a possible framework for normative media theory. Such questioning is the purpose of this article. Against the background of a postmodern and a postcolonial perspective on normative theory, questions related to the following are raised: the expediency of ubuntuism in the context of changed African cultural values, the distinctiveness of ubuntuism as an African moral philosophy, the vulnerability of moral philosophy to political misuse, ubuntuism in the context of the future of normative theory in a globalized world and changed media environment, and, the implications of ubuntuism for journalism practice. It is concluded that ubuntuism may pose a threat to freedom of expression. Given the nature of contemporary South African society and its media system, a postmodern emphasis on diversity and pluralism as the cornerstone of future normative theory is supported. (shrink)

We generalize the modal interpretation of quantum mechanics so that it may be applied to composite systems represented by arbitrary density operators. We discuss the interpretation these density operators receive and relate this to the discussion about the interpretation of proper and improper mixtures in the standard interpretation.

One of the older questions in the debate about Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is whether it is worthwhile for organizations to pay attention to societal demands. This debate was emotionally, normatively, and ideologically loaded. Up to the present, this question has been an important trigger for empirical research in CSR. However, the answer to the question has apparently not been found yet, at least that is what many researchers state. This apparent ambivalence in CSR consequences invites a literature study that (...) can clarify the debate and allow for the drawing of conclusions. The results of the literature study performed here reveal that there is indeed clear empirical evidence for a positive correlation between corporate social and financial performance. Voices that state the opposite refer to out-dated material. Since the beginnings of the CSR debate, societies have changed. We can therefore clearly state that, for the present Western society, “Good Ethics is Good Business.”. (shrink)

In this article, we discuss the development of the concept of a ‘law’ (of nature) in the work of the Dutch natural philosopher and experimenter Petrus van Musschenbroek (1692–1761). Since Van Musschenbroek is commonly described as one of the first ‘Newtonians’ on the Continent in the secondary literature, we focus more specifically on its relation to Newton’s views on this issue. Although he was certainly indebted to Newton for his thinking on laws (of nature), Van Musschenbroek’s views can be seen (...) to diverge from Newton’s on crucial points. We show, moreover, how his thinking on laws of nature was shaped by both international and local factors. We start with a brief discussion of Newton’s concept of ‘laws of nature’ in order to set the stage for Van Musschenbroek’s. We then document the development of Van Musschenbroek’s views on laws of nature in chronological order. We demonstrate how his thinking on laws of nature was tied to institutional, theological and scientific factors. We conclude by pointing to the broader significance of this case study for our understanding of the development of the concept ‘law of nature’ during the eighteenth century. (shrink)

Teaching is an important aspect of scientific practice. However, it has only recently become the subject of detailed historical and philosophical analyses. In this paper, I argue that Joseph Rouse’s philosophy of scientific practice has important implications for the study of scientific education. Rouse’s dynamic conception of scientific knowledge entails that education should occupy a central place in our analyses of scientific practices, as it is crucial in guaranteeing their temporal extension and sustenance. However, Rouse’s reconceptualization of scientific knowledge also (...) has implications for our understanding of scientific education itself. I will work out these implications, focussing on Rouse’s non-subject-centered account of scientific practices. More generally, I show how Rouse’s philosophy of science entails that the study of scientific education should take the form of an integrated history and philosophy of scientific education. (shrink)

In this dialogue with Yuk Hui, Pieter Lemmens explains the discipline called philosophy of technology and gives a concise overview of the most important contemporary approaches within this field. He also offers a critical evaluation of what are probably the two most salient characteristics of contemporary philosophy of technology, the so-called “empirical turn” and the “ethical turn,” which are deeply related and partly reflect the discipline’s on-going alignment with the global neoliberal agenda of exclusively profit-driven technological innovation. He also (...) critically reflects on recent developments in the molecular and informational life sciences such as genomics, metabolomics, bioinformatics and synthetic biology. (shrink)

This article has two general aims. It first of all critically reconsiders the empirical turn’s dismissal of transcendentalism in the philosophy of technology, in particular through the work of Ihde and Verbeek, and defends the continuing relevance of the notion of the transcencental in thinking about technology today, illustrating this mainly through a reading of Stiegler’s understanding of the human condition as a technical condition and his view of human (noetic) evolution as proceeding from a process of technical exteriorization. The (...) crucial issue that is missed by postphenomenology and the empirical turn is that technology itself in its empiricity occupies the (periodically changing) place of the transcendental. It thus fails to consider the transcendental operativity of technical artifacts within its own empiricist stance. Secondly, it argues for the continuing importance and usefulness of the idea of Technology with a capital T, equally discarded by the representatives of the empirical turn, in particular against the emerging backdrop of the Anthropocene as the age of decisive anthropogenic forcing of the planet and the growing dominance of what has recently been called the technosphere in Earth system science. With Stiegler I show that a proper, inherent dynamic of technology must be acknowledged historically, anthropologically, techno-evolutionarily as well as (techno)phenomenologically. I conclude by demonstrating that our time of planetary crisis summons us to redirect our attention to technology from the empirical to the transcendental, and from the micro-level to the macro-level again. (shrink)

This book is about how to understand quantum mechanics by means of a modal interpretation. Modal interpretations provide a general framework within which quantum mechanics can be considered as a theory that describes reality in terms of physical systems possessing definite properties. Quantum mechanics is standardly understood to be a theory about probabilities with which measurements have outcomes. Modal interpretations are relatively new attempts to present quantum mechanics as a theory which, like other physical theories, describes an observer-independent reality. In (...) this book, Pieter Vermaas summarises the results of this work. The book will be of great value to undergraduates, graduate students and researchers in philosophy of science, and physics departments with an interest in learning about modal interpretations of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

n various publications over the past years, Floridi has developed a theory of semantic information as well-formed, meaningful, and truthful data. This theory is more or less orthogonal to the standard entropy-based notions of information known from physics, information theory, and computer science that all define the amount of information in a certain system as a scalar value without any direct semantic implication. In this context the question rises what the exact relation between these various conceptions of information is and (...) whether there is a real need to enrich these mathematically more or less rigid definitions with a less formal notion of semantic information. I investigate various philosophical aspects of the more formal definitions of information in the light of Floridi’s theory. The position I defend is that the formal treatment of the notion of information as a general theory of entropy is one of the fundamental achievements of modern science that in itself is a rich source for new philosophical reflection. This makes information theory a competitor of classical epistemology rather than a servant. In this light Floridi’s philosophy of information is more a reprise of classical epistemology that only pays lip service to information theory but fails to address the important central questions of philosophy of information. Specifically, I will defend the view that notions that are associated with truth, knowledge, and meaning all can adequately be reconstructed in the context of modern information theory and that consequently there is no need to introduce a concept of semantic information. (shrink)

Statistics from both South Africa and the United States of America indicate that the phenomenon of violence amongst youths is increasing. This implies that a larger number of youths are being exposed to the experience of violence and thus present with the complex and multi-dimensional effects of such an experience. Past research has centred mostly on the causative factors that can be statistically represented, with little focus being paid to the juveniles’ in-depth, subjective experience of the phenomenon. For the male (...) adolescent, the experience of the phenomenon of violence is complex, diverse and may span across many aspects of his life, including physical, psychological, personal and social dimensions. Three participants were sourced from the Leeuwkop Juvenile Correctional Facility in Johannesburg and interviewed for the purpose of this study. The participants were selected based on their age (between 13 and 19 years of age) and the type of crime that they had committed (assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, common assault or indecent assault). In accordance with the phenomenological approach, open-ended interviews were used as a research method in order to allow for the participants’ unique and subjective experience of the phenomenon to emerge. The researchers found that the phenomenon of violence is characterised by the juveniles’ experience of external events that provoke a certain response manifesting itself in violent behaviour. The responses described by the participants were mostly emotional in nature and included emotions such as anger, rage and fury. The experience of violence also holds certain consequences for the male juvenile offender. The most common consequence experienced by all three participants was their subsequent arrest and incarceration in a correctional facility. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 11, Edition 1 May 2011, iii-v. (shrink)

La confrontation Kant/Wittgenstein qui se dessine ici n'a pas pour objectif principal de présenter les doctrines des deux auteurs. Il s'agit plutôt de marier ces pensées qui ne le désirent pas, de profiter de la confrontation pour faire avancer le débat. Quel débat? Contrairement à I'ordre historique, il tire son origine de Wittgenstein: comment faut-il comprendre les prorèmes que soulève Wittgenstein, les interdits qu'il pose? Certaines de ses affirmations ne peuvent tout simplement pas être des jugements analytiques, aurait dit Kant. (...) Nombre de ses «remarques grammaticales» ne sont évidemment pas des tautologies, et la question se pose au moins de savoir comment elles sont possibles comme jugements analytiques. (shrink)

Le but de ces quelques remarques sur le jugement est de faire apparaître cette notion sous différents éclairages , tout en assurant une certaine progression d’un point de vue à l’autre. Dans la première section, il sera question non seulement de la synthèse au sens kantien du jugement synthétique fondé sur l’intuition, mais également des trois synthèses predicative, véritative et apophantique distinguées par Heidegger et reprises par Lotz. La deuxième section, plus proche de la pensée de Wittgenstein, s’interroge sur le (...) jugement dans le cadre de la « grammaire philosophique ». Enfin, la troisième section examine l’idée d’un primat du jugement sur la base du primat de la raison théorique soutenu par Jacques Poulain. En apparence, cette thèse prend le contre-pied de celle de Kant dans la Critique de la raison pratique, sans qu’on puisse lui attribuer la volonté de fonder une nouvelle « philosophie théorique ».The aim of the following remarks on judgment is to present this notion from different points of view , with a certain progression from the first to the others point of view. In the first section, it will be question not only of synthesis in the kantian sense which bears upon intuition, but equally of the three syntheses distinguished by Heidegger and Lotz. The second section, more wittgensteinian in spirit, asks the question of judgment in the context of the " philosophical grammar ". Finally, the third section investigates Jacques Poulain’s idea of a primacy of judgment on the basis of the primacy of theoretical reason over practical reason. At first sight, this thesis of Poulain seems to go against Kant’s thesis in the Critic of practical Reason, but we don’t have to attribute to him the will to establish a new " theoretical philosophy ". (shrink)